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BAStRACt
From 1861 to 1870, more than 7,000 men came from all over Europe and 
even from beyond the Atlantic to voluntarily join the Papal army and defend the 
Holy See against the threat of Italian nationalism. Who were these men and 
what drove them to abandon their ordinary lives to take up arms in the defense 
of the Pope? Were they mercenaries in the service of a lost cause or idealistic 
and heroic combatants ready to sacrifice themselves for the Church, as their 
contemporaries saw them in contradictory views? Based on letters, journals, 
memoirs and various archival sources, this paper investigates the motivations 
and the experience of the Pontifical Zouaves.
keywords: Italy, Risorgimento, Nationalism, Papal Zouaves, Catholicism, Holy 
See, War Volunteering, XIXth century.
RESuMEn
Desde 1861 a 1870 más de 7.000 hombres llegaron procedentes de toda Eu-
ropa, incluso de más allá del Atlántico, para unirse voluntariamente al ejército 
papal y defender la Santa Sede contra la amenaza del nacionalismo italiano. 
¿Quiénes fueron estos hombres y que les empujó a abandonar sus vidas co-
tidianas para tomar las armas en defensa del Papa?, ¿fueron mercenarios al 
servicio de una causa perdida o combatientes idealistas y heroicos listos para 
sacrificarse por la Iglesia, tal y como los vieron sus contemporáneos en visiones 
contradictorias? A partir de cartas, diarios, memorias y diferentes fuentes de 
archivo, este artículo analiza las motivaciones y la experiencia de los zuavos 
pontificios.
palabras clave: Italia, Risorgimento, nacionalismo, zuavos papales, catoli-
cismo, Santa Sede, voluntariado de guerra, siglo XIX.
190
RESuM
Mercenaris o soldats de la fe? Els zuaus pontificis en la defensa 
de l’Església catòlica (1860-1870)
Des de 1861 a 1870, més de 7.000 homes van venir d’arreu d’Europa i fins 
i tot de més enllà de l’Atlàntic per unir-se a l’exèrcit papal i defensar la Santa 
Seu davant l’amenaça del nacionalisme italià. Qui eren aquests homes i què 
els va fer abandonar les seves vides ordinàries per prendre les armes en defen-
sa del Papa? Van ser mercenaris al servei d’una causa perduda o combatents 
idealistes i heroics preparats per sacrificar-se per l’Església, tal i com van ser 
vistos pels seus contemporanis en visions enfrontades? Mitjançant cartes, diaris 
i memòries, així com diferents fonts arxivístiques, aquest article investiga les 
motivacions i l’experiència dels zuaves pontificis.
paraules clau: Itàlia, Risorgimento, nacionalisme, zuaus papals, catolicisme, 
Santa Seu, voluntariat de guerra, segle XIX
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The photograph was taken in Rome, in 1860, in the workshop of the broth-
ers D’Alessandri, photographers of the papal court. The man who poses in 
uniform, leaning on a column, wears the characteristic outfit of the Tirailleurs 
franco-belges, inspired by that of the native troops of the French army in 
Africa, with its puffy canvas trousers, woolen belt and open waistcoat. The 
Franco-Belges were a force of Catholic volunteers set up at the beginning of 
1860 to protect the Holy See against further attacks of Italian nationalists, 
following the events of 1859 that had severed two-thirds of the Pontifical 
State.1  Like this man –Joseph-Louis Guérin, a native of the Nantes, who had 
engaged in August 1860 and died in the battle of Castelfidardo–, many 
recruits, most of them anonymous, took the pose in front of the camera in 
order to get a photographic portrait to be distributed to their relatives at 
home or to their new companions in arms, as was fashionable at that time 
among the upper and middle classes. Between 1861 and 1870, more than 
7,000 men came from all over Europe and even from beyond the Atlantic to 
voluntarily join the papal army, for varying periods of time ranging from six 
months to ten years.2  Who were these men and what drove them to aban-
don their ordinary lives to take up arms in the defense of the Holy See? For 
their detractors, they were merely mercenaries in the service of a lost cause, 
who had nothing to do on Italian soil. For the catholic propagandists, the 
Zouaves –the name they took from 1861– were the incarnation of the devo-
tion of the faithful to the Sovereign Pontiff and defended with heroism and 
idealistic self-denial a great struggle. At the time of the “Roman Question” 
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1 On the historical context, see: BEALES, D., and BIAGINI, E. (2002): The Risorgimento and the 
Unification of Italy. London, Longman, chap. 7; DUGGAN, C. (2008): The Force of Destiny: A 
History of Italy Since 1796. Boston-New York, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, chap. 10.
2 ANONYME (1910-1920), Matricule des zouaves pontificaux. Lille, Imp. Ducoulombier. On 
the history of this force, the bibliography is mainly in French: BITTARD DES PORTES, R. (1894): 
Histoire des zouaves pontificaux. Paris, Bloud et Barral; CERBELAUD SALAGNAC, G. (1963): 
Les zouaves pontificaux. Paris, Editions France-Empire; GUÉNEL, J. (1998): La dernière guerre 
du pape : les zouaves pontificaux au secours du Saint-Siège : 1860-1870. Rennes, Presses 
universitaires de Rennes. In English: COULOMBE, C. A. (2009) : The Pope’s legion : the multi-
national fighting force that defended the Vatican. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
192
http://http://dx.doi.org/10.6035/Millars.2017.43.7 - ISSN: 1132-9823 - vol. XLIII 2017/2 - pp. 189-218
Fig.- 1: Fratelli D’Alessandri, “Joseph-Louis Guérin”, Photograph (Albumin), 1860. 
(Private collection of Amaury de la Pinsonnais)
which divided the opinion of virtually all countries, the gaze way their con-
temporaries looked on the Zouaves was never neutral.
Throughout contemporary times, the struggles of the counter-revolutionary 
camp have inspired phenomena of international solidarity. Before 1860, 
Don Miguel’s army in Portugal in 1833-34 and Don Carlos’ war in Spain 
between 1834 and 1840 had also welcomed volunteer fighters from all 
over Europe to defend the cause of absolutism against liberalism, as would 
the second Carlist war of 1872-76.3 At the same time, when catholic volun-
teers joined in the service of the Pope, the cause of the King of Naples in 
exile attracted foreign volunteers, of whom the most famous, the Spaniard 
José Borges, died shot by the Italian army after five months at the head of 
the legitimist guerilla in the south of the peninsula.4 Later, the resistance of 
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the Boers in South Africa reactivated the memory of these engagements in 
the eyes of the French legitimist aristocracy, and the ideological conflicts 
of the 20th century renewed the ground for international mobilization, es-
pecially in the ranks of Franco’s army during the Spanish Civil War.5 In 
the light of these various manifestations of the internationalisation of the 
counterrevolutionary struggle, historians like Jean-Clément Martin and Jordi 
Canal have spoken of a “white (or black) international” that was born from 
the civil and political conflicts of the contemporary period and acted on 
the same grounds and with the same weapons as the liberal or democratic 
internationals.6 During the first half of the 19th century, military volunteers 
became a model of political engagement that was new and attractive, en-
dowed with a strong emotive and symbolic charge.7 Without any doubt, the 
success of this model owes much to the new conceptions of citizenship and 
heroism forged by the French Revolution and Romanticism, but the attrac-
tion of the volunteer force was not exclusive to the revolutionary ideas and 
ideals. The new romantic representations of volunteers in arms resonated 
perfectly with the reactionary mentality and lent itself to the recuperation of 
traditional values and conceptions such as the ideal of chivalric heroism, the 
spirit of a crusade or the sense of personal sacrifice.
3 HADENGUE, A : (1925). «Une équipée française au Portugal (1833) d’après des documents 
inédits». Revue des Questions Historiques, pp. 42-74 and 406-429; COUTANT DE SAISSEVAL, 
G. (1952): «La chouannerie espagnole, 1832-1936». Bulletin des sciences, arts et lettres de 
Cholet, pp. 49-55.
4 SARLIN, S. (2009): «Fighting the Risorgimento: foreign volunteers in the conflicts of Southern 
Italy (1860-1863)». Journal of Modern Italian Studies, nº 14 (4), pp. 476-490.
5  KEENE, J. (2001): Fighting for Franco : international volunteers in nationalist Spain during the 
Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939. London, Leicester University Press.
6 MARTIN, J-C. (2001): La contre-révolution en Europe, XVIIIe-XIXe siècles : réalités politiques 
et sociales, résonances culturelles et idéologiques. Rennes, Presses universitaires de Rennes; 
CANAL, J. (2011): «Guerres civiles en Europe au XIXe siècle, guerre civile européenne et Inter-
nationale blanche». ZUNIGA, J.-P. (ed.), Pratiques du transnational : terrains, preuves, limites. 
Paris, Centre des recherches historiques, pp. 57-77.
7 For Italy as ground of military volunteerism during the Romantic Age, see: PÉCOUT, G. (2009): 
«The international armed volunteers: pilgrims of a transnational Risorgimento». Journal of Mod-
ern Italian Studies, nº 14 (4), pp. 413-426; RIALL, L. (2012): «Men at War: Masculinity and 
Military Ideals in the Risorgimento». PATRIARCA, S. and RIALL, L. (eds.), The Risorgimento 
revisited : nationalism and culture in nineteenth-century Italy. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 
pp. 152-170; More generally on conceptions about military volunteerism: MOSSE, G. (1991): 
Fallen soldiers: reshaping the memory of the World Wars. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
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Pope’s soldiers have inspired abundant apologetic literature that often 
quotes their letters or their companions’ testimonies to illustrate their spirit 
of sacrifice and their devotion to the Catholic cause. Many of the former 
volunteers published memoirs, and their relatives gave to the public their 
journals and correspondence.8 These sources should be used with caution, 
as they –no less than guns– aimed at serving the objectives of the clerical 
movement by providing young militants and the entire Catholic community 
with idealistic models. Nevertheless, caution should not lead to reject any 
idea of sincerity from them. Together with other archival sources –the pa-
pers of general Lamoricière (commander of the Roman army in 1860) at 
the Archives Nationales in Paris; of the Pontifical Ministero delle Armi in 
Rome; and of various fonds in the Vatican Archivio Segreto– it is possible 
to investigate the motivations and the experience of those who voluntarily 
entered the ranks of the Zouaves during the last decade of the Papal Rome.
“we neeD A blooDy protest”: An ArMy of volunteers for the pope
Firstly, why were volunteers called upon to defend the Holy See? It was 
during the winter of 1859-1860 that the project to strengthen the Pontifical 
Army by appealing to the voluntary work of Catholics was conceived. The 
context was then marked by the developments of Italian nationalism, with 
the corollary of the precipitation of the “Roman question” (i.e. the mainte-
nance of a temporal power for the papacy). In the wake of the war between 
Piedmont and Austria in northern Italy, nationalist insurrections during the 
summer in the Legations, Marches and Umbria had clearly shown the limits 
of the policy of reliance on the Catholic powers pursued by the papacy 
since 1815.9 The passivity of the latter, especially of Austria, entangled in 
an internal crisis after its defeat in Italy, and of France, governed by Na-
poleon III, torn between its external ambitions and the pressure of Catholic 
opinion, forced the papal government to rely on its own strength. The de-
ployment of Swiss regiments made possible to regain militarily control of 
Umbria and the Marches, showing that the Pontifical State could defend 
itself. However, the situation remained precarious: despite the fact that pa-
8 For an overview, see HARRISON, C. E. (2007): «Zouave Stories : Gender, Catholic Spirituality 
and French Responses to the Roman Question». Journal of Modern History, nº 79 (2), pp. 274-
305.
9 VIAENE, V. (2002): «The Roman Question. Catholic Mobilisation and Papal Diplomacy during 
the Pontificate of Pius IX (1846-1878)». LAMBERTS, E. (ed.), The Black International, 1870-
1878: the Holy See and militant catholicism in Europe. Bruxelles, Institut historique belge de 
Rome, pp. 135-178.
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pal forces had easily overcome insurgents badly organized and armed, the 
concentration of various nationalist volunteer troops in Central Italy under 
the command of Garibaldi caused a much more serious danger. At the 
same time, diplomatic pressure from London and Paris for reforms of the 
Pontifical State did not weaken, with the support of liberal public opinion 
aroused by the indignation in front of the “Perugia massacres”.
In 1859, the turn of the internal and international political situation pushed 
Pius IX towards positions more and more intransigent on the ground of the 
pontifical temporal. Shortly before his troops entered in Perugia on June 
18th, the pope issued his encyclical Qui Nuper, in which he reaffirmed the 
need for the Holy See to retain its “civil power, so that nothing prevents it 
from exercising, in the interests of religion, his sacred magisterium”, and 
also affirmed his firm determination to “incur all dangers and endure all 
kind of suffering” before abandoning his apostolic duty. This uncompromis-
ing attitude was derived both from his ecclesiological conceptions – i.e. the 
belief in the necessity of the temporal to ensure the effective and visible in-
dependence of the spiritual leader of the Roman Catholic Church– and from 
political, secondary but effective considerations: the hostility to the liberal 
government of Turin, the categorical condemnation of liberalism and nation-
alism, and the awareness of close theoretical and pragmatic links between 
the defense of the temporal rights of the Holy See and the cause of other 
Italian sovereigns threatened by the nationalist revolution.10 The position of 
Pius IX didn’t vary. The Pope renewed it with firmness on September 26th 
(Maximo Animi), the day after the Legations were annexed to Victor Emma-
nuel’s crown, and again on January 19th, 1860 (Certe verbis), in response 
to the semi-official pamphlet Le Pape et le Congrès, which called upon the 
pope to renounce voluntarily his civil power. The growing intransigence of 
Pius IX laid down the framework of the policy of the pontifical government 
led by Cardinal Antonelli, who himself was in favor of a policy of tempo-
rization which would not have jeopardized French military protection. The 
Cardinal rejected any idea of reform without obtaining strong guarantees 
for the maintenance of the Papal States, or even their restoration in the ter-
ritories lost during the summer.
Increasingly skeptical about the results to be expected from diplomacy, Pius 
IX lent an ever more attentive ear to the most intransigent sectors of the 
Curia and the episcopacy, the Zelanti. Those pleaded for endowing the pa-
pacy with material means that would allow it to resist internal and external 
pressures for reform, and even to dispense with the protection of France. 
10 MARTINA, G. (1986): Pio IX. 2, 1851-1866. Rome, Ed. Pont. Univ. Gregoriana, pp. 106-107.
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An anonymous note of September 1859, preserved in the private archives 
of Pius IX, clearly sets forth this point of view.11 While “the princes were 
unfaithful and their advisors won over to the revolution,” it said, the Holy 
Father found supporters among “those faithful Catholics who are numerous 
but wrapped in the unity of their respective nation and must accept in spite 
of themselves a policy which they disavowed”. “For the moment they are 
weak because they were separated” but should “the Vicar of Jesus Christ 
make himself heard,” it asserted, “we do not doubt that a unanimous cry of 
faith and obedience will answer him and that thousands of volunteers from 
all corners of the globe will gather for the fulfillment of a sacred duty. They 
will be obedient and strong, for they will devoutly bring to the Holy Father 
the moral power of the profession of faith of many”. The author of the note 
believed that a call from the pope would be enough to make possible the 
formation of an army of Catholic volunteers of 40 to 50,000 men, enough 
to bring the rebellious provinces into obedience and to decide “all by one 
the famous objection of the foreign occupying bodies to the Roman states”, 
for “it would be from then the whole catholicity that would guarantee the 
independence of the pope”.
The principal advocate of this project in the entourage of Pius IX was a 
Belgian prelate, Bishop Xavier de Mérode. Before embracing his priestly 
vocation, he had served as an officer in the French army, and since 1850 
occupied the function of Secret Chamberlain. A boiling character, at once 
ardent Monarchist and uncompromising Catholic, he had imposed himself 
in the Curia as the leader of the Zelanti opposition to the policy of Cardi-
nal Antonelli (and no doubt that he used the project of military reform also 
to weaken the position of the Secretary of State).12 As early as December 
1859, Mérode had begun secret negotiations with a French general, Louis 
Juchault de Lamoricière, whom he wanted to convince on behalf of Pius IX 
to become the head of the Pontifical army. The name of Lamoricière was 
associated with the French conquest of Algeria (Mérode served there under 
his command), but also with the opposition to the coup d’état of December 
1851. In 1859, this choice was clearly a provocation against Napoleon 
III (“it is a small affront that we give to the emperor”, the Belgian prelate 
would have affirmed). The French general arrived in Rome at the beginning 
of April 1860, where he was officially appointed Generalissimo of the Pon-
11 ARCHIVIO SEGRETO VATICANO, Archiv. Part. Pio IX, Oggetti Vari, b. 1537 : «Note sur le 
Saint-Siège» (Turin, 15 September 1859).
12 AUBERT, R. (1956): «Mgr. de Mérode, ministre de la guerre sous Pie IX». Revue générale 
belge, nº XCII, pp. 1102-1116 and 1316-1332.
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tifical Army, while Mérode took the lead of a newborn Pro-Ministry of Arms.
Despite Antonelli’s opposition, Mérode-Lamoricière’s plan consisted of dou-
bling the size of the Pontifical Army, from 15-16,000 to 25 or 30,000 men. 
To achieve this result, voluntary enlistment of foreigners was called for, and 
it had previous precedents in the Roman army. The presence of foreigners 
had been reinforced in the aftermath of the revolutionary episode of 1849, 
when it had been necessary in order to rebuild the army without resorting to 
indigenous recruitment, that was deemed unreliable13. A law of 1852 regu-
lated the “conditions and treatment of foreign individuals called by the Holy 
See to constitute special military bodies”.14 Deposits were opened in France 
and in the Austrian Empire since, until 1859, the bulk of the volunteers came 
from Switzerland, Austria and the German States. In 1860, the commitment 
period was reduced from 4 years to 1 year to facilitate recruitment. The 
Swiss, Austrians and Germans still constituted the majority of the recruits, 
and allowed the creation of a battalion of Carabinieri and six battalions 
of foreign Bersaglieri, in addition to the two regiments of infantry and the 
two existing battalions of foreign Cacciatori.15 The arrival of volunteers from 
other countries led to the formation of new bodies on the basis of national 
membership: French and Belgians were regrouped in a battalion of Tiraglia-
tori (known as Franco-Belgians), who at the end of the summer of 1860 had 
a modest manpower of 450, while a battalion of Saint-Patrick welcomed 
the 1,300 volunteers sent by Ireland.16
The Roman army reached a number of 22,000 in September 1860, when 
the Piedmontese government –eager to take control of the South where the 
kingdom of the Two Sicilies had collapsed under the blows of Garibaldi– 
threatened to invade the Pontifical State, taking precisely as a pretext the 
presence of “foreign mercenaries” in the Roman troops. Faced with an 
13 MANCINI BARBIERI, A. (1986): «Nuove ricerche sulla presenza straniera nell’esercito pontifi-
cio 1850-1870». Rassegna storica del Risorgimento, nº 73, pp. 161-186.
14 SEGRETERIA DI STATO (1852). Legge colla quale il governo pontificio viene a determinare le 
condizioni ed il trattamento degli individui di nazione estera che chiama al servizio della S. 
Sede per costituirne dei corpi militari speciali. Rome, Tip. della Rev. cam. Apostolica.
15 VIGEVANO, A. (1920): La fine dell’esercito pontificio. Rome, Stab. poligr. per l’amministrazi-
one della guerra.
16 On the Irish Battalion, see: O’CARROLL, C. (2014): «The Irish Papal Brigade: Origins, Ob-
jectives and Fortunes». BARR, C., FINELLI, M. and O’CONNOR, A. (eds.), Nation, nazione: 
Irish nationalism and the Italian Risorgimento, 73-95. Dublin, University College Dublin Press; 
PANCIANI, M. C. (1986): «New Light on the Background to the Irish Participation in the Papal 
Army of 1860». The Irish Sword. The Journal of the military Society of Ireland, nº 16 (64), pp. 
155-164.
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army far more powerful in numbers and resources, the Pontifical leaders 
could only hope for a reversal of the international situation and a conserv-
ative reaction from the Catholic powers, which Pius IX and his entourage 
believed was inevitable.17 Without any illusion about the balance of power, 
the pope hoped that the army commanded by Lamoricière would “resist 
long enough to allow Europe to intervene before it is confronted with ac-
complished facts”.18 Some went further in their calculations and thought that 
a defeat of the pontifical troops would also serve the cause of the papacy, 
as it would arouse the emotion of the European Catholics. That was the 
meaning of what Lamoricière is reported to have said at eve of the battle: 
“We need a bloody protest”.19
The history of a transnational voluntary force at the service of the papacy 
could have ended in October 1860. The crushing defeat of the Roman army 
and the absence of reaction from the Catholic powers, which resulted in a 
reduction of the Pontifical State to the mere “Patrimony of St. Peter”, com-
pletely changed the situation and even greatly questioned the usefulness 
of maintaining an army of volunteers. The Catholic committees continued 
nevertheless to encourage the recruitment and departure of volunteers, but 
wondered who would be responsible for organizing and using them in 
Rome. Pius IX, for his part, declared in several occasions “that he could not 
bear a second Castelfidardo” and “that he never wanted to allow anyone 
to use his name, nor would make any call himself, and that he did not want 
in the present situation throwing anyone in the midst of perils”, but “that 
he expressed to those who came his gratitude for the sacrifice they made, 
instructing them to let their parents know that he was giving them his special 
blessing”.20 In spite of these hesitations, the Ministero delle Armi formed 
a new corps of volunteers, with the debris of the Franco-Belgian and Irish 
battalions, joined by the new recruits, who took the name of “battalion of 
the Pontifical Zouaves” under the commandant of the French colonel count 
of Becdelièvre.
17 MARTINA, Pio IX, p. 103.
18 JACINI, S. (1931): Il Tramonto del Potere temporale : nelle relazioni degli ambasciatori austri-
aci a Roma (1860-1870). Bari, Laterza, p. 31.
19 BECDELIèVRE, L.-A. de. (1867): Souvenirs de l’armée pontificale. Paris, Lecoffre fils, p. 65.
20 ARCHIVES NATIONALES, 289AP/76&78 : Armand Chaurand, 7 December 1860 ; Xavier 
de Mérode, Rome, 26 February 1861, and Gaston de Chevigné, Nantes, 11 March 1861 
(reporting a conversation with the Archbishop of Rennes on his return from Rome).
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The raison d’être of this force could no longer be of an offensive nature but 
a symbolic one. This orientation became clear when a beginning of military 
reconquest of the Sabine (presumably planned by Mérode himself) was 
attempted at the end of January 1861. Not only the move was immediately 
arrested and disavowed by the Pontifical Government, at the request of 
Antonelli, but the latter claimed and obtained the head of Becdelièvre who 
was replaced by Colonel Allet, a Swiss and quiet officer who had long been 
in the service of the Papacy. From this time onwards, the Zouaves were 
quartered far from the frontier zone, whose defense was assured only by 
the French troops until their withdrawal in 1865, and their missions were 
no longer very clear. In 1862, the Zouaves were even employed in the ex-
cavation work of Castro Pretorio, in order, as Mérode justified, to “occupy 
them” and “put them to work to avoid inaction”.21
Not without some irony, an officer saw as “one of the great miracles of mod-
ern times” the maintenance of a body charged with conducting an “armed 
and inactive protest”.22 The remoteness of the prospects for action and the 
vagueness surrounding the missions of the volunteer battalion put an ob-
stacle to the recruitment. From one thousand in 1861, commitments were 
limited to only two or three hundred in the following years. These arrivals 
barely compensated for departures and leaves, so that the battalion barely 
maintained its modest strength (between 620 and 750 men). The implemen-
tation of the Convention of September 1864, which planned the withdrawal 
of French troops (in exchange for the commitment of the Kingdom of Italy 
to respect the integrity of the Papal State), led to the rekindling of Catholic 
opinion’s mobilization: the number of Zouaves increased to nearly 2,250 in 
May 1865.23 After 1865, new missions were entrusted to them, such as the 
fight against the brigandage which raged in the south of Latium and which 
the pontifical government was thus trying to repress more actively, after 
having long tolerated it.24 The Zouaves also participated in the campaign 
of 1867 that stopped the Garibaldian attempt of invasion at Mentana and 
Monterotondo. After that dramatic event, the arrivals of volunteers reached 
a peak in 1867, with more than 3,000 recruits, justifying the passage of 
the rank of battalion to that of regiment: the Garibaldian invasion had elec-
21 ARCHIVES NATIONALES, 289AP/78 : X. de Mérode, Rome, December 1861.
22 Ivi: B. de Morelle, no date (1863).
23 CERBELAUD SALAGNAC, Les zouaves pontificaux, p. 112.
24 GRUAZ, L. (2016): «La répression du brigandage et la lutte contre le choléra : deux exemples 
de ”campagnes militaires” menées par les Zouaves pontificaux dans les États du Pape à la fin 
du XIXe siècle». Revue Historique des Armées, nº 284, pp. 103-112.
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trified Catholic opinion on both sides of the Atlantic. The regiment reached 
its maximum at the beginning of 1870 with 2,900 fighters. The Zouaves 
formed the fifth of the Roman army when Rome was invaded by Italian 
troops and ceased to belong to the Pope.
MerCenAries or CrusADers? A MAtter of CoMplex MotivAtions
From January 1st 1861 to September 20th 1870, the regiment of the Pontif-
ical Zouaves issued about 11,000 enlistments of soldiers and non-commis-
sioned officers and of 250 officers (ie, in view of the re-engagement, about 
7,000 men).25 What prompted thousands of young people to abandon 
everything to take up arms in defense of the papacy? For their contempo-
raries, this question gave rise to two opposing answers, the antinomy of 
which merely reflected the intense ideological opposition provoked by the 
“Roman question”. For the partisans of Italian unity the Zouaves were mere-
ly mercenaries attracted by the lure of gain or the spirit of adventure, while 
the defenders of the papacy saw in them volunteers who were enamored of 
religious ideals and ready to sacrifice themselves for the Church.
In 1860 and 1870, the Italian leaders did not hesitate to point the use of 
“foreign mercenary” to justify their military interventions against the Papa-
cy. When invading the Marches and Umbria, General Manfredo Fanti, who 
commanded the invading corps, called upon his soldiers to expel “from 
Italian soil foreign bands rushed from all over Europe” in order to plant 
“the false flag of a religion they flout”. In his order of the day, General 
Enrico Cialdini vituperated “against a band of foreign drunkards whom 
the thirst for gold and the desire for pillage have led to our country”. On 
the other hand, Catholic polemicists have not ceased to fight these accu-
sations through the publication of apologetic works, hagiographic biogra-
phies or martyrologies that celebrate the idealistic and chivalrous epic of 
the Zouaves. In a work published in 1861 in homage to the “Martyrs of 
Castelfidardo”, that would end as a true Catholic bestseller (he had known 
seventeen editions until 1892), Count Anatole de Ségur attacked “the en-
emies of the Holy See” who “slandered (the volunteers) with the name of 
mercenaries” and who “transformed into factious attitude the purest, most 
sincere religious of devotion”. For him, the “heroic young men” who fell on 
the battlefield were “martyrs of the Catholic faith, immortal martyrs of the 
papacy!”26 In a chapter ironically entitled “the mercenaries”, the journalist 
Louis Veuillot claimed that it was enough to demonstrate the falsity of ac-
25 ANONYME, Matricule des zouaves pontificaux.
26 SÉGUR, A. de. (1861): Les martyrs de Castelfidardo. Paris, A. Bray, p. 25.
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cusations against volunteers to quote their written letters to their parents. “I 
have shed my blood for my religion, defending the temporal power of the 
Holy Father,” wrote Louis Gicquel in a letter to his bishop. The young Lan-
franc de Beccary, who died in Castelfidardo at the age of 17, had “given 
his life for justice”. At the resolution of Léopold de Lippe, “no human motive 
was mingled,” for he “aspired only to devote himself to a holy cause”.27 
The catholic literature on the Zouaves systematically emphasized the youth 
of the volunteers, their innocence and virtue, in order to make them mod-
els for the Catholic youth, following the same models provided by the life 
stories of saints and martyrs in use in religious colleges.28 The comparison 
with the Crusaders of the Middle Ages was also common, like in Veuillot’s 
book. “At the call of the threatened Church”, Count Gaston du Plessis de 
Grénédan “set off with chivalric abnegation to take the sack and gun of 
modern knights”. The Belgian captain Georges Guelton “was indeed a son 
of the crusaders, and Godefroy and Baudoin had said to him: ‘Come with 
us to Palestine’”.
A careful examination of the sources shows –unsurprisingly– that it is impos-
sible to interpret the commitment of the volunteers to the Pope solely in terms 
of idealism. The pontifical authorities were aware of the risk of attracting to 
their service elements that might compromise the image or efficiency of their 
armed forces, even if the necessity of rapidly filling the ranks of the Roman 
army has led them to reduce their conditions to the minimum. The Foreign 
Recruitment Act of 1852, which was in force until 1870, stipulated that 
volunteers should report spontaneously to the various recruitment deposits, 
have no obligation to serve in their own country, be in good health, unmar-
ried or widowers without offspring; it also asked the recruits to “profess the 
Catholic, Apostolic and Roman religion” and to produce a certificate attest-
ing their “moral and political conduct”. In order to attract the largest number 
of candidates, the duration of the appointment was reduced from one year 
to six months for the Zouaves; on the other hand, financial difficulties of the 
Pontifical State led to the abolition of the commitment allowance of ten scudi 
provided by the law of 1852.
The maintenance of discipline in the corps of volunteers was also an object 
of constant concern for military authorities. The military penal code in use 
for foreign regiments indicted sentences for acts of treason and desertion, 
but also a whole range of offenses including homicide, rape, fire, coun-
terfeiting and smuggling, extortion, theft (with aggravation for the theft of 
27 VEUILLOT, E. (1861): Le Piémont dans les États de l’Église: documents et commentaires. Paris, 
Gaume frères et J. Duprey éditeurs, chap. 5.
28 HARRISON, «Zouave Stories».
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sacred objects) and even the desecration of sacred objects or places.29 Mil-
itary court registers reveal a significant number of convictions for desertion, 
“misconduct”, sale of military effect, theft or fraud.30 In July 1861, Captain 
Le Caron de Troussures estimated at a hundred the number of refusals or ex-
pulsions of the battalion, in reaction to a hostile article by La Presse; such a 
figure, he said, showed that the Zouaves “would not have anyone improper 
among them”.31 In his memoirs, an officer admitted that “the need to send 
as soon as possible” recruits and the lack of means and time “to organize 
investigations on the precedents” explained “the lack of men that were ex-
perimented, serious, skilled in military art”; but “gradually, as the regularity 
of the administration was established, we proceeded with more rigor and 
eliminated all elements more or less suspect”.32 
In other words, we must emphasize the limits of an interpretation made 
solely in terms of idealism or opportunism. In an article about Canadian 
volunteers in the struggles of the Risorgimento, Matteo Sanfilippo emphasiz-
es how “our vision of volunteerism in the 19th century derives in reality from 
the romantic imagination: whether he is a revolutionary or an uncompromis-
ing bigot, the volunteer is always considered an idealist ready to sacrifice 
himself”. The examination of individual realities often shows a more com-
plex picture, in which the volunteers obeyed a skein of motivations among 
which idealism was only one dimension. Whether they were Garibaldian 
volunteers (such as Arthur Buies who followed Garibaldi in Sicily in 1860) 
or the Pope’s soldiers, it appears that volunteers could enlist for “the most 
disparate reasons”: in order to flee their creditors, give vent to their spirit of 
adventure or because they were attracted by the promised rewards. These 
reasons are not the only ones, “but they must not be forgotten or underval-
ued” – and they are not necessarily incompatible with the expression of 
idealistic motives or the pursuit of ideal.33
It is difficult to draw a sociological profile of the volunteers, both because 
the sources provide incomplete information and because the available data 
show a real diversity. In the first place, those who responded to the call to 
29 ARCHIVIO DI STATO DI ROMA, Ministero delle Armi, 1144. Codice Penale e Militare per uso 
dei reggimenti esteri (1852).
30 See ARCHIVIO DI STATO DI ROMA, Ministero delle Armi, Rassegne.
31 ARCHIVES NATIONALES, 289AP/78 : Le Caron de Troussures, Anagni, 19 juillet 1861.
32  MAUDUIT, H. de. (2013): Souvenirs d’Henry de Mauduit, zouave pontifical. Saint-Martin-des-
Tilleuls, p. 8.
33 SANFILIPPO, M. (2007): «Fuggitivi e avventurieri: volontari nord-americani tra Garibaldi e Pio 
IX. Una proposta di ricerca». Ricerche di Storia Politica, nº 1, pp. 67-78.
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arms of the papacy between 1860 and 1870 belonged to all classes of so-
ciety. The predominance of noble names among the French officers should 
not be delusive –the Piedmontese general Cugia is said to have exclaimed, 
commenting on the list of wounded and dead of the Franco-Belgian bat-
talion in Castelfidardo: “What names! It seems like a ball invitation to the 
court of Louis XIV!” The nobility represented indeed a significant part of the 
contingent of French volunteers (a fifth in the case of the diocese of Nantes). 
The bulk of recruits, however, came from the middle and upper-middle class-
es, although the sources give only sparse indications of the volunteer’s or-
igins. Among the dead and wounded Franco-Belgians of Castelfidardo, 
Joseph-Guérin was the son of innkeepers in Noirmoutier; Paul Saucet be-
longed to a family of craftsmen of Nantes; Jacques Nalbert was the son of 
the owner of the Hotel des Missions Aliments in Paris; Louis Gicquel, who 
was 21 years old who had been an apprentice carpenter.
One social limitation of the recruitment of volunteers was that the transport 
and equipment were responsibility of the volunteers themselves, that is to 
say, for a private soldier the sum of 600 francs (the equivalent of the annual 
wage of a farm worker). For the Guides de Lamoricière, a body of cavalry, 
the first expense, with mount, harness and armament, amounted to more 
than 6,000 fr, so that there were only rich aristocrats in its ranks. This bar-
rier was partially lowered by the collective material assistance provided by 
the Catholic committees to the elements of the lower classes or their families. 
Among the Zouaves was a discreet number of servants and peasants. For 
B. de Morelle, the latter formed “the fundamental part of the battalion,” but 
they were also those more ready to quit because they felt “the homesick-
ness”.34 It was mainly in the Dutch contingent that the peasants were most 
present, with a quarter of the recruits, the second group after the artisans 
and the petty bourgeoisie.35 The plebeian origins of some volunteers have 
been put forward by Catholic commentators, like the Belgian journalist Guil-
laume Verspeyen, for whom the fact that “sons of the Crusaders […] did 
their duty alongside the son of the craftsmen” was a veritable “miracle of 
Christian fraternity” that seemed to revive the “first centuries of the Church”.
Age was another element of diversity. Many volunteers were young, even 
very young people. Of the 61 volunteers who joined from the diocese of 
Nantes in 1860, half (32) were under 20 years of age, and more than 
80% were under 25; 8 had not reached the minimum age of 18 years the-
34 B. de Morelle, Rome, 26 December 1862, quoted.
35 ZAAL, W. (1996): De vuist van de paus: de Nederlandse zouaven in Italië, 1860-1870. Nieu-
wegein, Uitg. Aspekt.
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oretically required by the law of 1852.36 Hagiographic Catholic literature 
emphasized the youthfulness of many volunteers, associating them with the 
qualities of innocence in order to exalt the value of their sacrifice. “This 
gentle and delicate adolescent”, exclaimed Mgr. Pie in the funeral oration 
of Georges d’Héliand (who fell in Castelfidardo at 19), was “the model of 
fervor and innocence”. “The young soldier”, wrote the Marquis de Segur, 
“was full of youth and health, he radiated life, innocence, and beauty”. 
Like Georges Miyonnet, Lanfranc de Beccary was 17 when he joined the 
papal army, “just emerging from childhood,” and in him “a soul as a hero” 
was clad in “an adolescent body”. Alfège de Beaudiez “died at the age 
of 20 [...] in all the flower of youth”. Alfred de Nanteuil, who died at the 
age of 21, bore the “triple crown of youth, beauty, and virtue”.37 But other 
volunteers abandoned, on the contrary, a well-established life. Philippe de 
Tournon, aged 40, was “rich, considered, married”. The average age was 
also higher among those who dropped out of a military career in the army 
of their country of origin or a foreign army.
Religiosity is another variable that is difficult to measure. Many young volun-
teers had just left the benches of religious colleges: the most prolific, that of 
St. Francis Xavier held by the Jesuits at Vannes in Brittany, sent no less than 
120 pupils between 1860 and 1870. Some clerics have even taken up 
arms, but their number is marginal –between 1860 and 1870 there were 
10 or so former seminarians and a novice of the Society of Jesus. On the 
other hand, more than 130 Zouaves entered the religious orders after their 
engagement in the Pontifical Army, with a predilection for missionary mis-
sions, and became Jesuits, Lazarists, priests of Foreign Missions, Mission-
aries of the Sacred Heart or White Fathers in Africa. There are, however, 
some indications that religious beliefs animated most of the volunteers, such 
as attendance at the religious ceremonies (military masses every Sunday 
and holydays, prayers every night at the barracks, retreats), or the forma-
tion of groups of piety (Congregations of the Blessed Virgin, Perpetual Ad-
oration of the Blessed Sacrement, or Conferences of St. Vincent de Paul).38
Neither ideology nor social origin, education and age are the only varia-
bles to be taken into account in order to understand voluntary commitments: 
social bonds play an important role in the dynamics that lead an individual 
to commit himself. This is illustrated by the contribution made by religious 
36 ANONYME, Matricule des zouaves pontificaux.
37 SÉGUR, Les martyrs de Castelfidardo, pp. 154, 129 and 95.
38 ALLARD, J.-S. (1880): Les zouaves pontificaux ou Journal de Mgr Daniel aumônier des Zou-
aves. Nantes, Bourgeois.
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colleges to the contingent of volunteers, which can be explained by two 
phenomena: the fact that the religious colleges played an crucial role in the 
formation and the transmission of a clerical culture based on uncompromis-
ing combat for Catholicism and political conservatism; and the driving ef-
fect of solidarity or emulation between classmates. Other logics of networks 
and driving effects have been at work. The aristocratic clienteles appear 
when, as in the Mauges or the Mayenne, the map of castles and that of 
recruitments can be superimposed. Elsewhere, it is the parochial dynamics 
and the strength of the ecclesiastical framework that play a decisive part. 
That is so in the little parish of Campbon in Brittany, which, with its 4,500 
inhabitants, sent no less than 29 volunteers, where played the combined 
action of Vicar Dabin and that of the old Marquis de Coislin (who at the age 
of 59 asked in 1860 to engage as a private soldier). Geldrop, a small town 
of 2000 souls in North Brabant (Holland), had 20 soldiers in the Pope’s 
army in 1868. Enlistment among the Zouaves has often been a family affair, 
and among them there are whole bunches of brothers, cousins, uncles and 
nephews –such as the four brothers Charette, the many Villèle, Sioc’han de 
Kersabiec, Cathelineau, Villiers de l’Isle-Adam and other great noble fam-
ilies. “It could be said now that there is no army where there are as many 
family affairs as in that of the Holy Father: and this crusade would have 
served only to develop the family spirit, it would already be something,” 
wrote Captain Le Caron de Troussure.39
The use of armed volunteering was not really a novelty in the Catholic-Con-
servative camp. During the 1830s and 1840s, in Portugal and Spain, vol-
unteers were engaged in the service of the causes of Dom Miguel and 
Don Carlos. To those who accused Spaniard José Borges of having landed 
in Calabria in 1860 to combat Italian unification, the Catholic journalist 
Charles Garnier replied that the Legitimists had “sowed enough drops of 
their blood on the various beaches of the world, in order not to reproach 
Borges for not being stingy with his own”, and that “they finally realized 
that the revolutionaries of all countries were making common cause, and 
that solidarity should be opposed to solidarity”.40 Although these mobiliza-
tions had mostly a “political” character in favor of the thrones threatened 
by the revolution, the struggle against “impiety” was part of the slogans of 
the traditionalist militants, and the Church had often supported those strug-
39 Le Caron de Troussure, Anagni, 19 July 1861, quoted.
40 GARNIER, C. (1861): Le Général Borgès. Paris, E. Dentu, p. 29.
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gles. Political conservatism was not without an echo in the mobilization of 
the Catholic world in favor of the papacy. On his way to Rome, Henri de 
Cathelineau, grandson of the Vendean Généralissime, was going to “crush 
the revolutionary hydra and save society”.41 We have already noted the 
presence among the officers of Zouaves with great names of the French 
legitimist aristocracy, to which were added, after 1868, the Carlist exiles 
around their pretender Don Alfonso de Bourbon. The pontifical authorities 
had not ignored the risk of a political instrumentalisation of voluntary ser-
vice in the pope’s army and tried to prevent too noisy political protests, 
especially for fear of antagonizing the French government. The refusal op-
posed to Cathelineau and his project of “Crusaders of St Peter”, an army 
corps both religious and military on the model of the chivalrous orders of the 
Middle Ages, was explained by reasons of internal discipline but also be-
cause of the political problem it would have posed for Napoleon III: it was 
perilous to grant a command to someone who represented the Legitimist 
party in France and who was suspected of wanting “to revive the legitimist 
party by the formation of an order of Crusaders gathered under the flag of 
religion”.42
The success of the Catholic mobilization of the 1860s can also be explained 
by evolutions specific to Catholicism that during the first half of the century 
gave rise to a first form of Catholic internationalism, oriented behind the 
slogans of uncompromising Catholicism and the defense of the papacy. 
Throughout Western Europe, secularization had produced intense confla-
grations between churches and states, which have embraced all spheres of 
social life in real “Culture Wars”.43 The various combats of Catholics in the 
1830s and 1840s –for freedom of education in France and Belgium, for 
emancipation in Ireland and Prussia, for Greek and Polish independences– 
had given rise in every country to an organized Catholic movement using 
modern means of mobilization, in which the laity occupied a more active 
place, at the head of committees and newspapers. Most of the members of 
the committees set up in 1860 for the financial collections and the recruitment 
of volunteers in defense of the papacy (Oeuvre du Denier de Saint-Pierre 
41 CATHELINEAU, V. de (1909): Le général comte de Cathelineau: chevalier de la Légion d’hon-
neur, commandeur de l’ordre de Pie IX, chevalier de la Tour et de l’Épée et de Don Miguel de 
Portugal : sa vie et ses mémoires. Rome-Paris-Bruxelles, Desclée De Brouwer, p. 131.
42 ARCHIVIO SEGRETO VATICANO, Archiv. Part. Pio IX_Oggetti Vari_1638. Progetti Cathelin-
eau.
43 CLARK, C., and KAISER, W. (ed.) (2003): Culture Wars. Secular-Catholic Conflict in Nine-
teenth-Century Europe. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
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in Belgium, Comité de Saint Pierre in France, Committee of St. Michael 
in Germany, Central Committee of Montreal in 1868) had a long past of 
clerical militancy. At the same time, the Catholic world underwent a process 
of standardization through a movement of centralization of the Church and 
the encouragement given to the universal cults (the Sacred Heart, the Virgin, 
the “Roman” saints). This devotional uniformity “gave expression to a bor-
derless economy of salvation that powerfully helped Catholics to reimagine 
themselves as a transnational community in the modern world”.44 The figure 
of the pope –“vicar of Jesus Christ” and “supreme pontiff of the universal 
Church”– had occupied an increasingly important place on the horizon of 
Catholics, thanks to an active campaign of ultramontanes, and has given 
birth to a genuine devotion to the pope sometimes pouring into what Mgr. 
Landriot (a Gallican prelate) denounced as mere “idolatry”. Many in 1860 
had the impression that the mobilization of the Catholic world revived the 
spirit of crusade dropped in Late Modernity. The enemies of the Church 
were no longer “the ferocious hordes” which threatened to invade Europe 
to spread Islam, according to the most uncompromising Bishop of Poitiers, 
Mgr. Pie, but the new and implacable barbarians “who rejected the reign 
of God on Earth”, the apostles of a “politics without God”. The commitment 
of the Zouaves was thus the incarnation of an uncompromising struggle for 
which the Catholics of the whole world were to unite their forces.
A MultinAtionAl forCe in hostile terrAin, or the ChAllenges of Cohesion
The Zouaves formed a truly international force. No less than 21 nationalities 
were represented, but among them the largest contingents were provided 
by the French and the Dutch, followed by the Belgians, the Swiss, the Ger-
mans and the Italians. In May 1865, of the 2.251 men, the national groups 
were consisting in 857 Dutch (38%), 651 French (29%), 485 Belgians 
(22%) and 146 from other countries (5%).45 After the episode of Mentana 
(1867), an opinion campaign tried to launch the recruitment of volunteers 
across the Atlantic. In Canada, Bishop Ignace Bourget, the ultramontane 
bishop of Montreal, supported his appeal on the publication of the Pontifi-
cal Brief of 17 November (in which Pius IX praised the courage and value of 
his troops who had been able to stop “i funesti nemici del nome cattolico”) 
and on the example of the Canadian pontifical Zouave, Alfred La Rocque, 
44 VIAENE, V. (2012): «Nineteenth-Century Catholic Internationalism and Its Predecessor». 
GREEN, A. and VIAENE, V. (eds.), Religious Internationals in the Modern World: Globalization 
and Faith Communities since 1750. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 89.
45 CERBELAUD SALAGNAC, Les zouaves pontificaux, p. 112.
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wounded during the campaign. A recruiting office was set up in the early 
days of 1868 and soon received more than 800 engagements, but limited 
means of arming and transport lowered the number of actual recruits to 
240. For reasons not well known, the four American archbishops discarded 
a similar initiative in the United States.46 
Maintaining the cohesion of such a heterogeneous force was not an easy 
task, especially since a social dimension was added to differences in na-
tionality and language. While many French volunteers were inexperienced 
young people from upper-class families, including many aristocratic off-
springs, or military officers that belonged to the same milieux, recruits from 
Belgium or Holland had a large number of peasants who spoke only Flem-
ish, or former soldiers who had no experience of command. The French 
were thus overrepresented in the command, among the non-commissioned 
officers (132 against 42 Belgians and 22 Dutch) and even more among 
the officers (36 against 6 Belgians and no Dutchman). This situation could 
only produce tensions on both sides. In a report to the Paris Committee, 
the French captain Charette complained of the “numberless recriminations” 
of the Dutch who demanded promotions, which he deemed impossible to 
satisfy because, if those were “active, intelligent, hard-working soldiers”, it 
was difficult to “find among them the elements needed to form cadres”; as 
for the (Flemish) Belgians, the French officer wrote, “I defy anyone to find 
an officer among them”.47 If the defense of the papal State gathered the 
volunteers under the banner of Pius IX, it did not obliterate cultural and so-
cial prejudices, as evidenced by a letter written in 1866 by Joseph Rialan, 
a young bourgeois from Brittany (a son of a sollicitor). He was afraid by 
the influx of new recruits being mostly made up of Flemish and the “French 
element” becoming a minority: “It follows that, if this continues, we will hear 
only the Flemish language spoken, which may be beautiful and agreeable 
to the inhabitants of Brussels and Ghent, but has the privilege of tearing my 
ears. Also I would like to see the French arrive here”.48
Internal cohesion was not the only factor weighing on the life of the Zou-
aves. The relations with the rest of components of the Roman army constitut-
ed another. On the one hand, the Zouaves received all kinds of attention of 
the pontifical leaders, who saw in them the window of the Catholic mobi-
46 MARRARO, H. (1944): «Canadian and American Zouaves in the Papal Army, 1868-1870». 
CCHA Report, nº 12 (45), pp. 83-102.
47 CERBELAUD SALAGNAC, Les zouaves pontificaux, p. 112.
48 OHEIX, R. (1868) : Joseph Rialan, sergent aux Zouaves pontificaux. Paris, J. Lecoffre, p. 151.
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lization on behalf of the papacy. The choice of their uniform, which mixed 
the costume of the native troops of Africa and of the French infantry, among 
all the models proposed to the Ministry of Arms, held both practical rea-
sons –the trousers puffed more adapted to the moves of the infantry and to 
the Roman heat– and of aesthetic considerations which should make of the 
uniform a constituent element of the identity and the image of the Zouaves: 
“it will be beautiful, it will attract people”, assured Colonel de Becdelièvre 
to defend his model.49 For the same reason, however, and due to both the 
susceptibilities of the French military command and the initial difficulties of 
organization, the Zouaves were kept in an isolated position and confined 
to unimportant missions. The cantonment of the troops between Anagni and 
the convent of Saint Paul Outside the Walls on the outskirts of Rome, devoid 
of tactical sense, had the advantage of “proving that [the papal authorities] 
are no longer afraid to produce the Zouaves in broad daylight, and to de-
stroy this opinion, that they did not dare to show to anyone this battalion 
of volunteers so unruly and ill-kept”.50 To compensate for the semi-abandon-
ment of the volunteer corps, Pius IX went several times to visit his soldiers 
for assuring them of his interest. In May 1862, the organization of a large 
military camp at Porto d’Anzio was to enable the Zouaves to parade before 
the pope, surrounded by his cardinals, and had the effect of establishing 
a “truly cordial entente” with the other foreign and indigenous bodies. The 
Pope regularly received in the Vatican the officers and families of the sol-
diers who had died in service, and handed over signed photographs with 
autographs praising their abnegation. After the midnight mass of 1863, 
Pius IX addressed the officers present, saying: “You are the representatives 
of the army, of the Pope’s little army. You are part of this army for justice. So 
you are truly the army of God”.51
The Zouaves served a state whose legitimacy was contested by a section of 
its population, and the opinion of the locals about them reflected these divi-
sions, as well as a more general mistrust about the presence of foreigners. 
They therefore operated largely in hostile terrain, as evidenced by the fre-
quency of cases of assault or assassination attempted on the volunteers. The 
first victim was a Belgian, the young Count Alfred de Limminghe, murdered 
in Rome under dubious circumstances, whose death many wanted to make 
a political affair. “The Zouaves spread imprudent rumours”, warned B. de 
49 BECDELIèVRE, Souvenirs de l’armée pontificale, p. 55.
50 Le Caron de Troussure, Anagni, 26 October 1861, quoted.
51 ALLARD, Les zouaves pontificaux, p. 106-107.
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Corcelle, because such stories risked “making people believe that Rome is 
a horribly agitated place” and discourage families from letting their chil-
dren enroll.52 The peculiar uniform of the Zouaves made them easy targets 
in the streets of Rome. “They murder prodigiously here,” wrote the Belgian 
volunteer Alexander de la Faille de Leverghem a few months later, after four 
assaults in two days and in the middle of the street. He himself never “went 
out alone and always with his pistol in his pocket,” nor “allowed himself to 
be approached at a distance where he could receive a stab”.53 In 1867 
two young Roman workers with nationalistic ideas chose a barracks of the 
Borgo Santo Spirito where Zouaves lived to carry out a bomb attack in-
tended to kick off a Garibaldian insurrection, killing 23 soldiers. They were 
immediately arrested and condemned to death for the crime of lese-majesté 
with the other conspirators, and executed the following year, in spite of 
the intervention of Victor Emmanuel himself. For their part, some Zouaves 
did not hesitate to express their royalist opinions and to attack the “patri-
ots”. In December 1863 a brawl between foreign soldiers of the Dragoons’ 
squadron and inhabitants in a cafe in Castel Gandolfo ended in an armed 
clash between the Pontifical soldiers and the French gendarmerie sent to the 
scene, with some dead and wounded. Administrative records often contain 
complaints from local authorities and the ecclesiastical hierarchy about the 
behavior of drunken soldiers, often involved in altercations with locals or 
with the Frenchmen of the expeditionary force.
The main peril that concerned the discipline of the corps of volunteers, how-
ever, was not the hostility of the populations or the disagreements between 
nationalities: it was boredom. A former soldier recalled that the garrison at 
Anagni “was none but frisky”. “In the first weeks the conscripts were not too 
bored, for the military training, vigorously pushed, left them little leisure; but 
once incorporated, it happened to us, as to everybody, to be in a hurry to 
leave”. The soldiers killed time by going on excursions “in the surrounding 
countryside, or on the nearby peaks, to enjoy the picturesque sites and 
beautiful points of view that were not wanting in the country”, or visiting 
the local sanctuaries and the villages reachable by foot.54 The garrison life 
was uncomfortable especially for young people who had no prior military 
52 ARCHIVES NATIONALES, 289AP/78 : Corcelle, Rome, 19 avril 1861.
53 LORETTE, J. (1966): «Documents sur la question romaine : la correspondance du volontaire 
pontifical Alexandre de la Faille de Leverghem». Risorgimento, nº 9, pp. 122-23.
54 DELAPORTE, V. (1905): Le P. Pierre Le Tallec, zouave pontifical, docteur du Collège Romain, 
jésuite (1843-1903). Saint-Brieuc, R. Prud’homme, pp. 34-36.
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experience. At St. Paul, the Zouaves were confined “in an old convent of 
famous unhealthiness, especially during the heat, but which freezes in the 
winter.” 55 For lack of means, the worn uniforms were not replaced and 
soon the Zouaves were covered with “rags”. The cantonment in the Roman 
outskirts had at least the advantage that “the neighborhood of Rome allows 
the young people [...] to see the city, visit the churches, etc., that is a happy 
diversion”.56 
The remoteness of the perspectives of action, the vagueness surrounding 
its missions and the boredom of the garrison life directly affected the cohe-
sion of the troop. At the end of its first year of operation, “the Pope’s little 
army [...] tired of its leisure, without future or prospect, wondered what was 
its role”, and “many young people were thinking about retirement”.57 The 
main reason for the young men’s departure was “lassitude and its too long 
duration of a life they had only embraced for a moment”. Many people felt 
the “homesickness”. If the number of those who requested a final leave was 
still limited, “others more often would take temporary leave, for a month or 
two”, which should not be granted too scantily “for fear of disgusting the 
postulant and to lose it altogether.”58 The hemorrhage continued in 1862 
and there was, according to one officer, “nothing to do to prevent these 
departures”. In order to stop it, Zouaves were allowed to re-engage for 
a month only but, “in spite of this measure, there are many who leave”.59 
A library was set up to “give a little nourishment to spirits weighed down 
by idleness”, and the expense of 600 to 800 francs for the purchase of 
books and newspapers seemed quite justified because this library was “an 
important resource” for volunteers.60 During religious retreats, preachers of 
renown were invited: Bishops Pie, Dreux-Brézé, Berthaud, Dupanloup, Mer-
millod or Le Cosquer had addressed the Zouaves. In spite of all these efforts, 
in 1863 again “the battalion of the Zouaves diminishes every day” because 
“voluntary recruitment [...] cannot compensate for the vacuum produced by 
the leaves”, and the situation “may give rise to fear of a near dissolution”. 
By the end of 1864, the battalion’s strength was “decreasing rather than 
increasing”.61 In 1865-66, the struggle against brigandage in the province 
55 Le Caron de Troussures, Anagni, 26 October 1861, quoted.
56 B. de Morelle, Rome, no date (1863), quoted.
57 ARCHIVES NATIONALES, 289AP/78 : C. de Latreiche, Lorète, 18 September 1861.
58 ARCHIVES NATIONALES, 289AP/78 : Le Caron de Troussures, Anagni, 26 October 1861.
59 ARCHIVES NATIONALES, 289AP/78 : B. de Morelle, Rome, 26 December 1862.
60 ARCHIVES NATIONALES, 289AP/78 : Lamoricière, «Affaires de Rome» (c. 1863).
61 ARCHIVES NATIONALES, 289AP/78 : Latreiche, Rome, 20 February & 20 October 1863, 29 
December 1864.
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of Velletri offered “a happy diversion” to the idleness, but it was ungrateful, 
for it obliged the troop to go on continual marches on rugged terrain and 
often with no purpose for the bands of brigands almost never allowed to be 
reached.62 After the campaign of 1867, the regiment regained its garrison 
life, but the fear of a nationalist insurrection or a European war deemed 
imminent kept the spirits alert.
ConClusion: hAt reMAineD of the CoMMitMent of the zouAves At the enD 
of the Century?
In 1867, in the aftermath of the Mentana and Monterotondo battles, Pius 
IX had erected a monument in the Roman cemetery of the Verano in honor 
of all the pontifical soldiers who had fallen for the defense of the Holy See. 
Since the end of 1861, this cemetery had received the remains of Zouaves 
dead during their service in the Papal State. In 1862, the tomb of Achille de 
Bligny, who died of illness during the summer at the military hospital in Ma-
rino, had even been monumentalized: it was surmounted by a statue of the 
volunteer lying as a giant, his hands crossed on his saber. The monument 
erected in 1867, designed by Virginio Vespignani, was formed by a high 
octagonal base, set on two steps, crowned by alternating semi-circular or 
triangular tympana, flanked by acroteria, and surmounted by a sculptural 
marble group, made by the sculptor Vincenzo Lucardi, that depicted St. 
Peter in the act of delivering the sword to a crusader, with a Latin inscription 
saying “accipe sanctum gladium munus a deo in quo deiicies adversarios 
populi mei israel” (Take this holy sword as a gift from God in order to over-
throw the adversaries of Israel). The 7 meters high monument was made of 
bronze and white marble. On the basis of stood a pedestal decorated with 
the allegorical figures of Faith and Fortitude, and on each prospect of the 
octagon, the names of all who had died in battle. The message was clear: 
the Zouaves were new crusaders who had put their swords at the service 
of religion, ready to go so far as to sacrifice their lives, and the Roman 
Church had found in them a bulwark against the revolution. This homage 
of stone to the volunteers, through the memory of their dead, sublimated 
the reality of an armed engagement whose importance had been more 
symbolic than military. Actually, diseases were by far the leading cause of 
mortality among the Zouaves, far ahead from heroic death on the battlefield 
to which many volunteers aspired. On the whole, among all the Zouaves 
that died in service (476), only one fifth (68) lost their lives by fighting in 
62  CHARETTE DE LA CONTRIE, A. (1876): Souvenir du régiment des zouaves pontificaux. Rome 
1860-1870, France 1870-1871. Notes et récits. Tours, Impr. Mame, p. 21-24.
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1867 or 1870; the vast majority succumbed to diseases such as smallpox, 
cholera, typhoid or malaria. The peak of mortality occurred in 1868, with 
152 deaths, a year in which there was no fighting. 63 However, these figures 
are not surprising for the armies of that time. And if the Pontifical forces had 
been able to face the attempt to invade an irregular troop in 1867, neither 
the Zouaves nor the small Roman army as a whole were able to delay more 
than a few hours the advance of the regular army of Victor Emmanuel in 
1870. Only the diplomatic and military protection of France, undermined 
by the collapse of the imperial regime, had been the basis of the survival of 
the Papal State during the ten years after the proclamation of the Kingdom 
of Italy. 
Despite their modest military contribution, the decadal experience of the 
Pontifical Zouaves was of great symbolic importance. The Italian govern-
ment’s decision to dissolve their corps and to expel them to their respective 
countries immediately after the seizure of Rome is the best proof. The for-
mation of a corps of volunteers in arms firstly testified the rise of a Catholic 
internationalism capable of mobilizing by all means on behalf of the un-
compromising struggle against secularization that was crystallized by the 
defense of the papacy and based on national clerical movements united 
by transnational solidarity. From the Catholic mobilization of the 1860s 
emerged new political and military commitments. A large part of the Zou-
aves dismissed in September 1870 engaged in the Franco-Prussian war, 
under the standard of the Virgin and the French flag, while others joined the 
Don Carlos camp in Spain in the hope of restoring the traditional monarchy 
beyond the Pyrenees.64 At the very moment when the Pontifical State was 
living its twilight and representatives of the Catholic world flocked to Rome 
to prepare the council of 1870, plans were made for international coordi-
nation, a ‘Black internationale’ led by a network of laity activists organised 
by a permanent office whose goal was to act openly at the head of a new 
crusade to restore the “social reign of Jesus Christ” –not thought armed 
fights anymore but with the same weapons and in direct rivalry with the 
Workers’ Internationale.65 For more than two decades, the captain Charette 
animated in France the association of the former Zouaves and volunteers 
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of the West, that the republican police suspected of being the nucleus of 
a paramilitary organization to be ready to support the hoped return of the 
Legitimate claimant on the throne. In 1885, for the 25th anniversary of the 
creation of the regiment, Charette exclaimed in his castle of La Basse-Motte 
in Brittany: “Does this mean that our silver wedding is the last act of our 
legend? [...] As Colonel d’Albiousse said, ‘As long as there is a cross and 
a sword in France, we have the right to hope.’ How many times did we 
believe that everything was lost, and then a fact, on which we could not 
count, arose, and we found ourselves together, ready to fight and to die, if 
necessary, for God and the Fatherland, because we have no right to belie 
our legend!”66 At the end of the century, international solidarity in favor of 
the Boer peasants in the struggle against Protestant and industrial England 
was not without echo with the commitment of the Zouaves and, still more, 
the wars of Vendée, in a continuity embodied by the presence of French and 
Ducth former soldiers of Pius IX among the foreign fighters.
After 1870, the memory of the commitment of the Zouaves continued di-
viding and inspiring opposing interpretations. On the one hand the clerical 
circles celebrated the epic of the pope’s soldiers through the publication of 
memoirs, apologetic works or bulletins (such as L’Avant-Garde, published 
in France from 1892 to 1907). On the other hand the “official” memory in 
united Italy had engraved in the marble the imputation of mercenarism. In 
Rome, which became the capital of the unitary state, the epigraphs hostile 
to the pope’s soldiers flourished: “mercenaries of the pope” [“mercenari 
pontifici”, on the Salario bridge], “foreign mercenaries” [“mercenari stra-
nieri”, on the Verano Monument], “hired, base and ferocious mercenaries” 
[“prezzolati, vili e feroci mercenari”, on Ajani Palace where patriots had 
resisted Zouaves who had been sent to arrest them], “foreign militias of 
mercenaries who defended the temporal power of Popes” (on the Gari-
baldian ossuary of the Janiculum). No experience of international armed 
volunteerism, however, has escaped this ambivalence in the eyes of their 
contemporaries: had not Garibaldi been described by his opponents at the 
same time as a filibuster or a condottiere, an adventurer, a braggart soldier 
or a brave with an empty head? This ambivalence merely reflected the ide-
ological divisions of conflicts that were both civil wars and episodes of a 
vaster international ideological struggle. The interpretation of volunteering 
from a Manichean point of view must be disregarded, as its motivations use 
to be complex on an individual scale: idealism, opportunism or thirst for 
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adventures are mixed in to varying degrees, without excluding one another. 
The experience of the pontifical volunteers between 1860 and 1870 is not 
exempt from this rule. Seen from a different perspective, it participates in a 
romantic conception of political commitment based on the notion of fraterni-
ty and international solidarity and on the mobility of small committed groups 
that fed international armed volunteerism throughout the century and after, 
of which all political groups have taken part.
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